I. Introduction
Child labor is a perplexing problem. In fact, it is debatable whether it is appropriate to label it a problem at all. If, as many recent economic studies on the topic suggest, child labor is a result of (and a strategy to avoid) household poverty, then it may be viewed not so much as a problem but as a solution to poverty's crushing effects. This is perplexing fo r policy makers because this means that banning child labor may, in fact, harm the very people it attempts to help (see, e.g., Basu and Van (1998) ). There are many other ways in which this aspect of child labor can lead to situations that pose potential challenges to policy makers. The present study attempts to explore one of them: that the use of child labor by families to avoid poverty can cause it to persist through the generations of that family. If this is indeed the case, then policy makers that wish to promote policies that lead to long-term reductions in child labor are faced with the new challenge of focusing their attention not only on current child laborers, but future ones as well.
Although there has been some excellent recent theoretical work examining the inter-generational links in child labor and identifying the potential for inter-generational child labor traps (see e.g., Baland and Robinson, 2000; Basu, 1999; Bell and Gersbach, 2000; Lopez-Calva and Miyamoto, 2000; Basu, 1999; Ranjan, 1999) i , there is a marked absence of empirical work on the topic. This study is an attempt to rectify that omission by examining the inter-generational persistence of child labor empirically. Previous empirical work on child labor has primarily focused on isolating the determinants of child labor using survey data (see e.g., Ray, 2000 Ray, , 1999 Jensen and Neilsen, 1997; Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 1997; Psacharopoulos, 1997; and Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995) . This paper takes a different approach by asking two related questions. One, does the child labor status of parents impact the child labor incidence of their children? We find strong evidence that it does. Two, is this link only a function of permanent family income or is there a direct link between the child labor status of the parents and their children? We find evidence that such a direct link exists.
We begin our examination of the inter-generational persistence in child labor first by discussing the economic reasons to expect an inter-generational link, and then by examining empirical evidence from Brazil. Our discussion focuses on the mechanisms through which parental child labor can lead to the child labor of the children, and concentrates on one critical assumption: that child labor interferes with a child's educational attainment. If this assumption is correct, then children who worked while growing up will not be able to command as high a wage as they would have had they not been child laborers. Once they reach adulthood, these individuals will have lower incomes and will more likely be forced to send their children to work as well.
We then turn to an empirical investigation into the persistence of child labor by examining Brazilian household survey data. We exploit the fact that the data include information on the child labor of both parents and children in a family as well as information on the educational achievement of the grandparents. We find that people who start work at a younger age end up with lower earnings as adults, and that children are more likely to be child laborers the younger their parents were when they entered the labor force, and the lower the educational attainment of their parents as well as their grandparents. These findings are consistent with our discussion of the persistence mechanisms. However, we also find that this inter-generational persistence remains even when we control for proxies of family permanent income, such as current family income and parental education. This result suggests that there may be other reasons for the persistence of child labor over and above poverty, for example, social norms or parental preferences.
II. The Inter-Generational Child Labor Link
As mentioned above, the starting point for our discussion of the inter-generational child labor link is the assumption that families prefer to withhold their children from the labor market until they are adults. Instead they opt to invest in their schooling. However if a family is struggling to survive, they may have to resort to sending some or all of their children to the labor market.
In this section we present a discussion of the inter-generational persistence of child labor that incorporates the essential aspects of previous theoretical work.
ii The recent theoretical literature on child labor and poverty traps incorporates a set of core assumptions: that parents are altruistic toward their children; that there is a trade-off between child labor and a child's human capital accumulation; that the child's human capital accumulation is an increasing function of schooling; and that the credit market is imperfect. With these basic assumptions in place, it becomes quite easy to characterize the case of inter-generational persistence in child labor.
We begin by considering a family where parents care about the educational attainment of their children. If the family has access to adequate resources, they will choose to invest in the education of their children. However, if they are faced with the problem of not having enough income from the parents to keep the family above the subsistence level, they will choose to send some or all of their children to work to ensure the survival of the family. Due to the lack of capital markets, families are unable to borrow against the future earnings of their children and thus have no other choice than to sacrifice some of their children's schooling and send them to work. This reduction in schooling causes a loss of overall human capital accumulation, in other words the knowledge and skills that are valuable in the adult labor market. Thus, this loss of human capital from child labor results in lower wages as adult.
From the simple story outlined above, the cycle becomes clear: if a child is born into a poor family, he/she is more likely to work as a child laborer than a child born into a wealthy family. Having to work as a child laborer limits the amount of education that he/she receives and thus he/she will have lower human capital level as an adult than a child who did not have to work as a child laborer. The low level of human capital means that this same child, now an adult, will earn lower wages as a result. Lower wages as an adult mean that he/she will be more likely to be forced to send his/her children to work as child workers.
This cycle can lead to multiple generations of a family being stuck in what could be termed a child labor trap. This is easily illustrated with a simple figure. If we consider the level of adult human capital a function of the education received as a child then we can express this idea as: 
The shape of this function can take on many forms but one very plausible one is 5 illustrated in Figure 1 . The rationale for such a shape is easily motivated by what is termed in the literature 'sheepskin effects,' or non-linearities in the returns to education.
In other words, the wages one can command from the labor market jump up or at least increase disproportionately upon reaching a certain level of education, for example literacy, a grade school certificate, high school diploma, college degree, etc. These types of 'sheepskin effects' can cause the human capital accumulation function of children, which is a function of their parent's human capital, to have an S-shape like the one in Figure 1 .
In Figure 1, perhaps parents who worked as children feel that it imparts important qualities in children and want those qualities instilled in their children as well. There could also be a social stigma attached to having parents that were child laborers that prevents normal returns to education. These and other stories can also lead to persistence, but in general we expect these effects to be second order.
III. The Data and Empirical Strategy

The Data
The data used in this study come from the 1996 Brazilian Household Surveys This study utilizes a sample that consists of individuals between 10 and 14 years old that are considered a son, daughter or other relative in the family unit.
iii Each observation consists of information on the child's characteristics, his or her parent's characteristics and his or her family's characteristics. Since we are primarily concerned with the impact of the parent's child labor status on the child labor status of the children, we use a sample of observations with complete information of the father's and the mother's characteristics. Due to this criterion, families with single heads are excluded from the analysis. iv Finally, all observations for which the age difference between the head of the family or spouse, and the oldest child is 14 years or below, are excluded as well.
The child labor variables for the children are constructed as follows. A child is considered working if he or she worked on the labor market any strictly positive hours per week. v Moreover, a child is considered to work full time if he or she worked 20 hours or more on the labor market per week. Both definitions of child labor will be used to check the robustness of the results.
The child labor variable for the parents is defined as follows. The PNAD survey asks each individual the age at which he or she started to work. A parent who responded that they began working in the labor market at 14 years old or below is considered to have been a child laborer. Again, we will also use an alternate definition where we consider an adult to have been a child laborer if they entered the labor force at age 10 or below to check the robustness of the results and to account for any generational differences in child labor no rms.
For each child, we also obtained his or her school attendance status, gender and region of residence. Similarly, we constructed years of schooling, age and employment status of the parents. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the basic statistics of all the variables used in this analysis. 
Empirical Strategy
To test the inter-generational effect of child labor we estimate a probit model of the child labor indicator variable on the parental child labor status variables and a vector of other controls. The probit model estimates the effect of the independent variables on the probability that the child is a child laborer. Our goal in estimating the probit model is to capture the persistence in child labor by estimating the effect of having a mother or father who was a child laborer on the probability of the observed child's child labor status while controlling for other observable characteristics that may also effects the child's likelihood of working in the labor market (for example their age, gender, number of siblings, etc.). We first estimate a model that neither controls for the schooling of the parents nor the income of the family. This is in keeping with the theoretical discussion that hypothesizes that the inter-generational link is transmitted through adult income (which is a function of schooling).
We next test for a 'direct' link in child labor. If the assumption that child labor only comes as a result of familial poverty is correct, then by controlling for family wealth or permane nt income, we should see the effect of parental child labor on their children's incidence of child labor disappear. It is well established that parental education is the most reliable predictor of a family permanent income. Thus, we start by including parental education, which, as in the discussion above, is a likely mechanism through which child labor is transmitted between generations. If there is still an effect after controlling for parental education, then we can be fairly confident that education (or at least that aspect of education we can measure -years of schooling -as opposed to some sort of quality normalized measure) is not the entire story. Parental education, however, may not encompass entirely one's family wealth or one's family income flows. Thus, we next include current family income to strengthen the test for a 'direct' link in child labor.
A potential problem with this result, however, is that the family income variable is likely endogenous. Table 1a presents the proportions of child labor and adult's child labor status in 1996 for the base-line definitions of child labor for the children and parents. In Table 1a , of all 10 to 14 year old children in the sample, 13.9 percent worked in the labor market.
IV. The Inter-Generational Persistence of Child Labor in Brazil
Unconditional Probabilities
70.6 percent of their fathers were child laborers and 37.2 percent of their mothers started working at age 14 or below. More importantly, of all children belonging to a family in which the father was a child laborer, 17.3 percent are child laborers. On the other hand, of all children coming from a family in which the father was not a child laborer, only 5.9 percent are child laborers. Similarly, of all children that belong to a family in which the mother was a child laborer, 24.3 percent are child laborers, and all children coming from a family in which the mother was not a child laborer, around 7.8 percent are child laborers. Table 1b presents similar figures when the child labor variable is defined as working at least twenty hours a week. In this case, of all children aged ten to fourteen, 10.5 percent are child laborers. Again, a child that comes from a family where the father or the mother was a child laborer are approximately three times more likely to be working compared to a child whose father or mother was not a child laborer.
Although these figures are unconditional probabilities, they suggest the existence of intergenerational persistence in child labor in Brazil.
Probit Model Estimations on Child Labor Indicator Variables
To estimate the effect of parental child labor on the incidence of work among youths aged 10-14, we first estimate a standard probit model. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the child usually works any strictly positive hours in the labor market. This is regressed on indicator variables that equal one if the child's mother and father were child laborers (began working at age 14 or below). Also included are the age of the child, the age of the parents, the number of brothers and sisters aged 0-5, 6-9, 10-14 and 15-17, and indicators for if the child is female, lives in an urban area, has a father that is not in the labor market, has a mother that is not in the labor market. vii The results are shown in the first column of Table 2. viii We find that parental child labor has a strong and positive effect on the probability that a child is in the labor force. Moreover, a female child and children in urban areas are less likely to work in the labor market. Also, the greater the number of siblings aged 5 to 14, the more likely the child is to work. Children are also less likely to work if either parent is not in the labor market.
ix If the child labor trap explanation outlined in the model is the only determinant of the intergenerational persistence of child labor, then the parental child labor effect should vanish when one controls for family wealth or any appropriate proxy for it. One such proxy is the education of the parents.
Column three shows the results of the regression added the parent's years of schooling as dependent variables. As expected, the years of schooling of the parents has a strongly negative and significant effect on the child's probability of working. These results ind icate that a child is more likely to be a laborer if his/her parents were child laborers and less likely the more educated are his/her parents. The effect of parental child labor remains positive and statistically significant, thus testifies that parental child labor has effects on children's work over and above that of the parents' educational status.
In order to evaluate the impact of the grandparents' education on child labor status of the grandson or granddaughter and to possibly enhance the proxy for family permanent income, we also estimate a probit model that includes the years of schooling of the child's grandparents as explanatory variables.
x Column 5 of Table 2 shows the coefficients from the complete set of regressors. When we include the parents' education variables, the years of schooling of grandparents becomes insignificant. These results suggest that there is no direct link between grandparents' education and child labor status of the grandchild. Although not reported, we estimated a probit including grandparents' years of schooling but excluding the parents' years of schooling variables. In this case, the grandparents schooling variables became significant. Thus, the schooling effect appears to operate through the education of the parents only.
Probit Model Estimations including Family Income
Adding income of the family in our probit specification makes the model likely to suffer from an endogeneity problem, but considering income as an explanatory variable is useful for it can help determine if education of the parents is an adequate proxy for permanent family income. The income of the family minus the income from the observed child is included in the regressions in Table 3 . The first specification includes both the family income variable as well as the parents' education variable. The results of this regression are given in the first column of Table 3 . In this case, the coefficients on both parents' child labor indicator variables are positive and significant and the coefficients on the parents' education variables are negative and significant. The coefficient on the family income variable is not significant, however. In the second specification, shown in column three of Table 3 , the schooling of the parents is not included. Here, the coefficients on the parents' child labor indicator variables are still positive and significant but now the coefficient on the family income variable is negative and significant.
From these results it again appears that there is an effect of parental child labor over and above that of the effect on family income and parental education. These results are not predicted by our simple model and suggest that the effects of parental child labor may be more complex than the simple human capital relationship posited in our model.
This suggests that future research is needed to shed more light on this aspect of child labor. For example, it could be that human capital accumulation is not only determined by the amount of education, but by social norms, preferences, the quality of education, the level of education of siblings, the household environment, etc.
Nonetheless, the results suggest that there is indeed a 'family wealth effect' on child labor. To illustrate the interaction between parental child labor status and their educational achievement, Figure 2 presents the difference in the probability of working in the labor market for a 12 year-old child coming from a family with parents who were child laborers, compared to a family where parents were not child laborers. It is assumed that both parents have the same level of education, that they are both in the labor market, forty years old and have only one child. The probability differences are constructed for sons and daughters in rural and urban areas separately, and use the coefficients from the first column of Table 2 . Notice first that, for any level of parental education, a child that belongs to a family with parents who were child laborers is more likely to be a child laborer. Second, this difference decreases as the education level of the parents increases.
This is exactly what we would expect from our child labor persistence hypothesis.
V. The Harmful Effects of Child Labor
So far we have shown strong evidence of inter-generational persistence of child labor in Brazil. However, in order to explain why we should be concerned with the incidence of child labor, it is important to look at the economic consequences of child labor in a person's life. One main negative effect of child labor is the potential for child labor to hamper the ability of the adult to generate higher earnings. This is also a key hypothesis of the persistence story outlined in Section II.
In order to assess the impact of having been a child laborer on current earnings, we estimate both a simple OLS regression and a Heckman selection model for both mothers and fathers in the sample. In these specifications we regress the log of current earnings on age and age squared, age they started work and its square, the grandfather's years of schooling, the grandmother's years of schooling and a race indicator variable. In addition, in separate specifications, we add the individual's years of schooling. The
Heckman estimations attempt to correct for the fact that we only observe the income of those individuals who 'self-select' to work as adults. If the decision to work as an adult were in any way correlated with having been a child laborer, this would cause our results to be biased and suspect. For the selection-bias corrected estimations we add the number of sons and daughters aged zero to nine years old in the first stage regression. The results are given in Table 4 .
For both fathers and mothers, the coefficient on the age they started working is positive and significant in all specifications. In the specification that excludes the years of schooling variables, the age at which the individual started to work coefficients can be interpreted as the forgone earnings of an individual entering one year earlier in the labor market. Moreover, child labor has a negative impact on current earnings even when we control for education and other variables. This means that there are negative aspects of having been a child laborer over and above that of loosing out on education, again raising questions about the precise nature of the effects of parental child labor on children.
Therefore there do not appear to be positive effects on adult earnings of gaining work experience as a child laborer. The squared term is negative and significant, meaning that the marginal negative impact of child labor for adults lessens the later the individual enters the labor force.
The results of Table 4 show that on average child labor hampers the individual's adult earnings. Emerson and Portela Souza (2002) , however, examines this aspect of child labor more closely and finds that in some instances (i.e. for particular occupations) child labor may not be harmful. The general idea is that there may be some professions that have strong vocational aspect to them and by acquiring job-specific human capital for these professions individuals may be able to do well as adults as a result. The results here suggest that though there may be some areas where child labor is beneficial, those areas are greatly outweighed by the ones that are harmful.
IV. Conclusion and Comment on Policy
The results presented in this study suggest that there is a significant relationship between a parent's child labor incidence and years of schooling and those of their children. We find that children are more likely to be child laborers if their parents were as well. In addition, we find that children are less likely to be child workers the more educated their parents are. Moreover, the educational attainment of grandparents does not directly affect the child's labor status, but there seems to be an indirect impact that is transmitted through the parents' education. These results hold when we control for family income as well. Additionally, earnings as an adult are lower, ceteris paribus, the earlier the individual enters the labor market. Together, these results paint a striking picture of the inter-generational persistence and the harmful effects of child labor within families.
The fact that there appears to be an inter-generational effect of child labor over and above that which is transmitted through household income and parental education suggests that the simple persistence model, presented in Section II, does not explain all of the ways through which parental child labor effects the children. This suggests that richer models are needed that present a more sophisticated view of the household child labor choice that accounts for this aspect of persistence. If, on the one hand, the results in this study come from some unobservable human capital characteristics that is captured by the parental child labor variables (e.g., school quality), then our finding is essentially capturing the intergenerational effects of poverty persistence and thus it is consistent with our theoretical discussion of child labor persistence. If, on the other hand, it comes from a difference in the preferences of households in which parents were child laborers, or different social norms associated with child labor experience, then the current theoretical child labor literature is not adequate to fully explain child labor in Brazil.
These results pose some complicated challenges for policy makers. If the persistence story as outlined in Section II is correct, or at least a major part of what we have observed, this suggests that it might be better to tackle the child labor problem on a family-by-family basis. What we mean is this: if there are only limited resources to spend on the reduction of child labor it may be better to target this money at select families to raise each out of the child labor 'trap.' This would be much more effective in the long-run than dividing the resources evenly which might ease the poverty incentive to send children of the current generation to work, but may lift only a few families above the critical level of resources needed to keep them out of child labor for the generations to come. Bell and Gersbach (2000) have examined just such a system in their model of education. This type of policy is likely to be very unpopular politically, but would have lasting long term benefits as opposed to families falling into the same trap and needing to be helped again in the next generation.
One thing is clear however: if child labor is indeed mostly a result of familial poverty, banning child labor can have quite harmful effects (see Basu and Van, 1998) and should be treated with the utmost of caution. However, if there are significant effects of parental child labor that exists over and above that of the link posited in Section II of this paper, for example from social norms, a more challenging policy problem presents itself.
If poverty is a small part of the story and norms or parental preferences are the major factors, then policy solutions like absolute bans on child labor may be more effective.
Given the results presented in this study, we believe that both poverty and parental preferences are significant factors, but that poverty is still the most important motivation for child labor that can be targeted by policy makers. Policies like the familytargeted one described above, in conjunction with an educational program to counteract norms or beliefs on the part of parents that child labor is 'good' for their children may be the best way to address this problem. These policies are important because, as this study shows, child labor has lasting and harmful effects on an individual's earnings ability as an adult. The negative effect of the loss of educational attainment is greater than the positive effect of gaining experience as a child laborer. xi Thus intervention is, in our view, both necessary and important. Table A1 presents the means, standard deviations and the minimum and maximum values for some selected variables. Because years of schooling and child labor are likely correlated, Table A2 presents the correlation matrix for the age at which the individual started work variable and the years of schooling variables for both fathers and mothers. The correlation coefficient is 0.03 for both mothers and fathers, so there is a correlation, but it is not as strong as might be expected. xii Table A3 presents the unconditional probabilities between the labor force participation and schooling of the sons and daughters in the sample. Table A4 presents the raw data associated with the hours worked of the children in the sample. 
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